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Abstract
This paper studies what I consider to be the true starting point of significant Japanese-
Brazilian trade and investment relations, the 1935 Hirao Hachisaburo economic mission to
Brazil.  This mission was prompted by Japanese concern about the Japanese-American
bilateral trade balance and geo-strategic control over natural resources.  It resulted in a
dramatic increase in Japanese imports of Brazilian raw cotton and numerous textile related
and other Japanese investments in Brazil.  These investments, in turn, would constitute a
solid basis for post-war textile related and other investments in Brazil.
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wishes to thank for their constructive criticism Prof. Dr. E. Buyst (Catholic University
Leuven - Belgium), Prof. Dr. EM H. Van der Wee (Catholic University Leuven - Belgium),
Prof. Dr. Ishii Kanji (Tokyo Keizai Daigaku - Japan), Prof. Dr. Tamas Szmrecsanyi -
Brazil) and the members of the Quantitative Economic History working group (Catholic
University Leuven).  The usual disclaimer regarding remaining errors applies.
21.  INTRODUCTION1
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Brazil is not unimportant.  Before 1960, a
crucial period of economic recovery and serious foreign exchange shortages in Japan,
Brazil is the most important host country of Japanese FDI after the United States.2
Afterwards, notwithstanding another Japanese investment boom in Brazil during the late
1960s and early 1970s, Brazil's relative importance as a host country of Japanese FDI
decreases.3  That is mainly due to dramatically rising Japanese FDI in Asia.  However,
recently, i.a. because of the development of MERCOSUR, Brazil is once more gaining
importance as a host country of Japanese FDI.
This paper studies what I consider to be the true starting point of significant Japanese-
Brazilian trade and investment relations: the 1935 Japanese private sector trade mission to
Brazil.  As a direct result thereof, Japanese trade with and investments in Brazil, mainly
related to raw cotton, significantly increase.
This paper is part of a larger study of Japanese expansion, which asks why Japanese firms
invest abroad and how they carry out their investment decision.  The emphasis is on the
extent to which Japanese expansion benefits from interplay between different modes of
international interaction, such as diplomacy, trade, investment and migration.
Therefore, this paper asks to what extent the 1935 mission and subsequent Japanese trade
and investment initiatives benefited from public-private sector cooperation, co-optation of
Japanese migrant communities and cooperation among different (kinds of) Japanese firms.
A conclusion of this paper is that apparently private initiatives benefit from government
support, target the Japanese migrant community in Brazil, and are characterized by
significant cooperation among Japanese firms.
The reader will first be presented with a brief analysis of the Japanese production structure,
imports and exports during the interwar period.  Next, the development and structure of the
cotton spinning and weaving industries are discussed, as well as industry output, exports
and imports.  This connects to a following section on interwar raw cotton requirements and
supply relations.  Brazil as an alternative provider of raw cotton is then introduced.  This
sets the stage for an analysis of the composition, content and outcome of the 1935 trade
                                                
1 With regard to the formatting of this paper, names are given in the
Japanese manner: last names come first.
2 BEAMISH and others, 1997: 59.
3 Japan’s accumulated FDI in Brazil during the period 1951-1994 amounts
to US$ 8.8 billion, or 16 percent of Japan’s accumulated FDI in Latin
America, and 1.7 percent of Japan’s accumulated FDI worldwide.  Putting
these comparatively small figures into context is the fact that these
figures have been severely distorted by speculative investment for tax
purposes in, for instance, the Cayman Islands (US$ 9.2 billion), the
Bahamas (US$ 3.7 billion), and Bermuda (US$ 3.6 billion).  (KAGAMI, 1998:
10-11)
3mission, with particular emphasis on the importance of the Japanese immigrant community
in Brazil.
2.  SOME BACKGROUND ON THE JAPANESE ECONOMY AND COTTON
INDUSTRY OF THE INTERWAR PERIOD
2.1.  The wider economy: rapid industrialization through light manufacturing
The Japanese economy of the interwar period is a growing and rapidly changing economy.
The growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) is modest and erratic4 during the 1920s,
notably higher and less erratic during the 1930s.5  Japan becomes a much more
industrialized society.  Growth concentrates first in light manufacturing, later in heavy and
chemical industries, particularly from the mid-1930s onwards.6  With changes in the
production structure come changes in the importance, composition and sources of imports
and exports.  Imports become more important as the interwar ratio of imports to gross
national expenditure (GNE) rises from 17.5 percent in 1919 to 22.1 percent in 1938.7  The
share of manufactured imports, which decreases before and during World War I, decreases
further during the 1920s to increase again in the 1930s because of forced expansion of
industrial capacity.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the share of food stuffs and raw materials
imports – raw cotton during the 1920s, joined by metal ores and fuels during the 1930s –
increases continually.8  Thus it is clear that “by the 1930s the functions of imports had
become those of providing the food and raw materials for an economy that was relatively
poorly endowed to produce them, as well as access to advanced capital equipment for an
economy where, relative to the more advanced economies, skills and capital were scarce.”9
During the interwar period, Asia and North America account for a fairly constant share of
Japanese imports, while the European share decreases dramatically, and the Latin
American share increases significantly.10
                                                
4 Variations reflect i.a. the post-World War I speculation and crash of
March 1920; the Great Kanto (i.e. Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures)
Earthquake of 1 September 1923, which kills 91,000 people and partially
or completely destroys 69,000 houses; the 1927 bank crisis; and the post-
1929 world recession.  For a general description see NAKAMURA, 1994: 11
and 29-35, and PATRICK, 1971: 229 and 240-249.
5 For GDP see OHKAWA and others, 1979: 278-280: Table A12.
6 For GDP by industry see OHKAWA and others, 1979: 278-280: Table A12.
7 For the percentage composition of GNE see OHKAWA and others, 1979: 18:
Table 1.5.
8 For the structure of imports see HOWE, 1996: 127: Table 5.6.
9 HOWE, 1996: 126.
10 For an overview of major sources of Japanese imports see HOWE, 1996:
132: Table 5.11.
4We take a closer look at exports, given that their function is ”to supply the foreign
exchange to pay for imports and to provide opportunities for Japanese industry to achieve a
scale of operation and a degree of modernization otherwise unattainable.”11  The interwar
ratio of exports to GNE remains fairly constant.  It is 21.2 percent in 1919 and 21.4 percent
in 1938.12  During the interwar period, the share of primary product exports decreases
rapidly.  That of manufactured goods exports – textiles during the 1920s, joined by
products from the heavy and chemical industries during the 1930s - rapidly increases.13
Export markets shift as North American – based on exports of silk and tea -  and European
shares decrease and Latin American and Asian shares increase.  The most dramatic
increase is in exports to Asia: textiles and labor intensive manufactures to Korea, China
and South-East Asia; and capital goods to Manchuria.14
2.2.  The cotton industry: rapid growth
The previous section demonstrated the importance during the interwar period of light
manufacturing industries.  The single most important industry among them is the textile
industry.  And among its different components, the cotton industry comes first, outpacing
in terms of export earnings by the mid-1930s the silk reeling and weaving, rayon and other
textile industries.15  This reflects the phenomenal growth of the Japanese cotton industry
after its establishment in the years 1860 and 1870.16  The cotton spinning component
accounts for 74 companies, 281 spinning mills, 11.5 million spindles and 168,800 workers
in 1935.  It is at that time responsible for 26 percent of the value of total textile industry
output and 8 percent of the value of total manufacturing industry output.17  And with those
statistics it is the world’s fifth largest cotton spinning country.18  In that same year, it
produces 1,424 million pounds of cotton yarn, up from 607 million pounds in 1913.19  The
cotton weaving component experiences similar growth.20  But it becomes much less
concentrated than the cotton spinning component, consisting to a significant extent of
                                                
11 HOWE, 1996: 128.
12 For the percentage composition of GNE see OHKAWA and others, 1979: 18:
Table 1.5.
13 For the structure of exports see HOWE, 1996: 129: Table 5.7.
14 For an overview of major destinations of Japanese exports see HOWE,
1996: 132: Table 5.10.
15 For an overview of the different components’ export earnings see FEAJ
(various years).
16 For a concise history of the cotton industry see ALLEN, 1981: 73-76,
123-124 and 151-154, and HOWE, 1996: chapters 7 and 8.
17 JMYB, 1939 (1): 395.
18 JMYB, 1937: 415.
19 ALLEN, 1981: 75, and JMYB, 1939 (1): 396.
20 For an overview of growth in the number of looms see ALLEN, 1981: 261:
Table E.
5medium and small weaving sheds and a domestic industry component.21  Cotton cloth
output grows accordingly from 417 million yards in 1913 to 1,844 million yards in 1935.22
Cotton cloth also accounts for most of the cotton industry’s exports, reaching 2,725 million
square yards, representing 496 million yen in 1935.23
Playing an important role in the promotion of these cotton yarn and cloth exports through
the development of export plans and the negotiation on behalf of the Japanese government
of  raw cotton import and textile export quota agreements with foreign governments is the
textile industry’s most powerful cartel, the All Japan Cotton Spinners’ Association24,
established in 1882 under indirect government guidance.  In 1937, the cartel groups 72 out
of 82 cotton spinning companies and thus controls 97 percent of spindles operating in
Japan.  Membership further extends to practically all industry raw cotton importers and
cotton yarn and cloth exporters.  Its activities, in addition to export promotion, range from
dissemination of new textile technology and promotion of large-scale spinning companies
to regulation of textile industry labor contracts.
2.3.  The cotton industry: raw cotton import requirements
Previous sections established the importance during the interwar period of light
manufacturing industries in general and the cotton industry in particular.  Now we will take
a closer look at what this prominence of the cotton industry means for the volume and
value of Japanese imports.  In accordance with the aforementioned growth in cotton yarn
and cotton cloth output, Japanese imports of raw cotton grow dramatically during the
interwar period.  From 449,000 ton in 1915-1919 to 825,000 ton in 1935-37, or 216 million
yen in 1915 to 851 million yen in 1937.25  Year to year variation is significant, however,
Japanese imports of raw cotton being determined by the combined domestic and foreign
demand for Japanese cotton cloth.  Dominant therein is the foreign demand for Japanese
cotton cloth or Japanese cotton cloth exports.
Japan’s cotton industry reaches import substitution for cotton yarn in 1897, and cotton
cloth in 1910.26  Subsequently, exports are boosted by World War I.  The inability of
European countries to serve Asian export markets and rising world prices allow Japanese
textile firms to increase output dramatically and capture those markets.  After the war,
                                                
21 ALLEN, 1981: 124.
22 JMYB, 1937: 419, and JMYB, 1939 (1): 395.
23 ALLEN, 1981: 260: Table C, JMYB, 1936 (2): 408, and JMYB, 1939 (1):
398.
24 In Japanese: Dai Nihon Bôseki Rengôkai.
25 For volume see ALLEN, 1981: 260: Table A.  For value see FEAJ (various
years).
26 HOWE, 1996: 186.
6Japan is able to hold on to these export markets and even further strengthen its position, i.e.
increase its market share in several markets, reaching in 1935, for instance, 83 percent of
the Java market, 72 percent of the Chinese market, 64 percent of the Philippines market,
and 51 percent of the Indian market for cotton textiles.27  This translates into a  growing
share of the world market as Japanese export expansion takes place at the expense of other
exporters, mainly Great Britain.  Thus Japan’s share of the world market for cotton goods
as measured by British pounds grows from 12.8 percent in 1925 to 28.5 percent in 1934.
Great Britain accounts for 52.8 percent of the world cotton goods market in 1925 and only
39 percent in 1934.  In terms of export volume, Japan overtakes Britain in 1933.28
This expansion takes place in view of a large number of obstacles.  The post-1929 world
recession and consequent decrease in aggregate demand causes the world market for cotton
goods to shrink from a value of 285.2 million British pounds in 1924 to 102 million
pounds in 1934.29  Changing economic fortunes and natural disasters (e.g. flooding) in
important export markets, such as China and India, or trade embargoes and restrictions
against Japanese exports because of political or economic reasons also hit Japan.
In such conditions, Japan is able to realize this expansion by delivering good quality at ever
lower prices.  The value of Japanese cotton cloth exports rises from 433 million yen in
1925 to 492 million yen in 1934, an increase by 14 percent.  The volume of Japanese
cotton cloth exports, however, rises from 1,298 million square yards in 1925 to 2,577.2
million square yards in 1934, an increase by 99 percent.30  How does Japan drive down the
price ever more?
Japanese spinning firms purchase raw materials in a cost-efficient manner through a small
number of highly specialized raw cotton trading companies.  The latter work through well-
connected and communicating subsidiaries everywhere, with small margins, on the basis of
commissions.  They often co-own spinning mills and weaving sheds.31  Japanese spinning
firms are thus better placed than their European competitors to exploit the benefits
conferred by the interwar market for raw cotton, which is essentially a buyers’ market,
where supply exceeds demand.  From an international perspective, the cost of Japanese
labor, though rising, is also low.  The industry is also in a constant state of reorganization
and rationalization.  Mergers result in larger firms, which tend to integrate spinning,
weaving and related activities, thus creating “economies of scale in raw materials
                                                
27 HOWE, 1996: 218.
28 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 376-378, and JMYB, 1939
(1): 395.
29 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 376-378.
30 ALLEN, 1981: 260: Table C, JMYB, 1936 (2): 408, and JMYB, 1939 (1):
398.
31 ICB, 1934 (3): 112-113, and INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE,
1936-38: 476.
7purchasing, marketing and market research.”32  Japanese spinning and weaving firms invest
continually in improved (Japan-made) technology.33  They seek consistently for more
productive organizational patterns of labor in the face of, for instance, 1929 labor
legislation curbing night work.34  And they are successful in adapting accounting and
management systems to the organization of “large numbers of plants of varying technical
characteristics, specializations and marketing objectives”.35  It is estimated that through
such measures between 1930 and 1935 the cost of production is cut by 50 percent.36
Finally, currency exchange movements further drive down the international price of
Japanese goods.  In December 1931, Japan suspends the gold standard and devalues, just
two months after the British suspension of the gold standard.37
2.4.  The cotton industry: raw cotton supply relations
Meeting Japanese raw cotton import requirements during the 1920s and 1930s are some of
the then world’s most important raw cotton producers and exporters38: the United States,
India, Egypt, China and Brazil.39
Most important interwar raw cotton suppliers are the United States and India.  During the
1920s, together they account for 90 percent of the volume of Japanese raw cotton imports.
After a peak of 93 percent in 1932, this decreases to 82 percent in 1937.40  Three
distinctive periods can be distinguished.  (See Graph/Table 1)
In a first period, which extends from the second half of the 1920s to the early 1930s,
gradual switching takes place from Indian to United States raw cotton.  The value of
Japanese imports of United States raw cotton overtakes that of imports of Indian raw cotton
in 1927, the volume in 1931.  Such gradual substitution takes place because after the 1926
record crop the price of United States raw cotton, which is of higher quality than Indian
raw cotton, decreases.  This facilitates a shift in Japanese textile production towards higher
quality goods.41
A second period covers the years 1932 to 1934 and entails a more dramatic shift from
                                                
32 HOWE, 1996: 209.
33 For an overview of textile investment in technology see HOWE, 1996:
212, and ICB, 1934 (3): 114.
34 JMYB, 1936 (2): 411.
35 HOWE, 1996: 214.
36 JMYB, 1939 (1): 396.
37 For yen-dollar and yen-pound exchange rates see PATRICK, 1971: 233.
38 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 162.
39 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 248 and 272, and JMYB,
1939 (1): 397.
40 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 248 and 272, and JMYB,
1939 (1): 397.
41 INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE, 1936-38: 474.
8Indian to United States raw cotton.  The volume of Japanese imports of Indian raw cotton
decreases from 288 million kilos in 1931 to 164 million kilos in 1932, the value from 113
million yen in 1931 to 92 million yen in 1932.  Conversely, the volume of Japanese
imports of United States raw cotton increases from 319 million kilos in 1931 to 546
million kilos in 1932.  Such drastic substitution occurs because of Japanese-Indian trade
frictions.  In response to the 1920s Japanese trade expansion, the 1931 yen devaluation and
the subsequent outcry of western textiles industries, western governments, concerned about
employment in domestic textile industries, duly comply with requests for higher import
tariffs.  Among these are particularly hurtful to Japanese textiles exports the Indian
discriminatory import tariffs, affecting access to one of Japan’s main textile export
markets, and promoted by Great Britain, main victim of Japan’s trade expansion.42  They
add to the woes bestowed upon the Japanese textile industry by a rapidly shrinking post-
1929 world market for cotton goods; unfavorable currency developments during the years
1930-1931; and a number of Chinese boycotts of Japanese textiles exports from September
1931 onwards as a result of the Manchurian affair.  Restricted access to the Indian market
leads to a Japanese boycott of Indian raw cotton in June 1932. Eventually, however, an
agreement tying Japanese exports of cotton goods to India to its imports of Indian raw
cotton is reached with India.  The belated 1934 result of the Simla Conference, convened to
resolve the crisis in Japanese-Indian trade relations prompted by the 1932 Japanese boycott
of Indian raw cotton, stipulates that if, during a given crop season, Japan buys one million
bales of Indian raw cotton, then Japan is allowed to export to India 325 million yards of
cotton cloth.  For every 10,000 bales below one million, 2 million yards of exports are
subtracted.  For every 10,000 bales above one million, 1.5 million yards of exports are
added.  Under no circumstance, however, can Japanese exports to India exceed 400 million
yards per year.43  This agreement allows Japan to increase raw cotton imports from India
again.  As a result, imports of Indian and United States raw cotton bounce back to pre-1932
relative positions, but somewhat higher absolute values because of the on-going increase in
raw cotton imports.
A third period starts in 1934 and entails a rapid decrease in Japanese imports of United
States raw cotton, which, because of the Simla accord, cannot entirely be compensated for
by an increase in imports of Indian raw cotton.  The volume of Japanese imports of United
States raw cotton decreases from 389 million kilos in 1934 to 253 million kilos in 1937.  I
believe that this pattern is due to Japan’s concern about reduced exports to and a
                                                
42 For Indian tariff raising see ICB, 1930: 14, ICB, 1932: 163, and ICB,
1933 (3): 755.
43 For the Simla Conference see INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL D’AGRICULTURE,
1936-38: 472-474, BULLETIN, 1936 (2): 14-15, BULLETIN, 1937: 20.
9deteriorating trade balance with the United States, and about geo-strategic control over
natural resources. 44
Japan’s concern about the bilateral Japanese-American trade balance is due to the changing
nature of international trade during the 1930s.  Within a context of free trade, countries aim
to balance trade overall and compensate for trade deficits somewhere through trade
surpluses elsewhere.  But the decade of the 1930s is well known as the decade of
protectionism, where free trade is no longer possible.  A country limits imports, particularly
from low-cost producers such as Japan.  The exporting country retaliates.  An agreement is
reached, which aims to balance trade between the two countries.  Illustrative of this pattern
are the aforementioned Japanese-Indian trade frictions and the solution thereof.  With
exports thus constrained, a country under export pressure like Japan, will try to export
more to other markets, in the first place to other industrialized markets, later also to non-
industrialized markets.  Illustrative of this pattern is the Japanese reasoning on the boycott
of Indian raw cotton during the Japanese-Indian trade frictions: “No doubt, the price of
American cotton is somewhat dearer than Indian cotton, and therefore the replacement of
the latter with the former raw material means more expense for the country’s cotton
industry...(but)...purchase by Japan of a vast amount of cotton from America is bound to
stimulate American purchase of Japanese raw silk, which is so important to the economic
welfare of Japan.  This will, in turn, help greatly to stabilize the exchange between the
United States and Japan… .”45  Problem is, however, that gradually all industrialized
countries put limits on imports of Japanese products.  Trade frictions similar to those with
Indian develop with Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States.46  In 1934, Japanese
silk exports to the United States experience a significant decline as part of a process which
starts in 1930.  Also in 1934, the United States for the first time imposes trade restrictions
on specific Japanese export items, in casu carpets and pencils.47
These two developments cause the Japanese trade deficit with the United States to jump
from 129 to 370 million yen.  (See Graph/Table 2)
In response to increasingly constrained worldwide Japanese export possibilities, the
                                                
44 We thus dispute the theory that Japan turns away from the United
States in order to avoid raw materials dependency in view of the coming
war. The quest for alternative sources of raw cotton supply starts in
1934 already.  At that time, there is no threat of war.  Furthermore, a
threat-of-war theory would lead one to expect Japan to aim to reduce
total imports from and reduce its overall trade deficit with the United
States at all cost, which is not the case.  From 1931 onwards, Japan
continually increases total imports from the United States.  (SAITO,
s.d.: 168)
45 ICB, 1933 (2): 751.
46 ISHII, 1995.
47 For the role of United States trade restrictions see FEAJ, 1935: 152.
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Japanese Government enacts trade legislation.  In 1930, the Japanese Government aims to
increase exports to not yet constrained industrialized and non-industrialized export markets
through an Export Subsidy Law, which provides for special financial assistance to firms
selling in North and South America, Russia, Africa and parts of Asia.48  At the same time,
the government attempts to reduce the possibility of further trade frictions developing with
existing or new markets.  The tool is domestic regulation aimed at softening competition
among Japanese manufacturing and export firms.  Article 2 of the 1931 Major Industries
Control Law stipulates that the minister has the right to order firms which are not members
of an existing cartel to conform with cartel decisions, either when two thirds of cartel
members request him to do so, or when the minister thinks it is necessary to protect
reasonable profits in the industry and ensure adequate development of the national
economy.49  And through the 1933 Export Control Law “Government intends to exert
some control over exports of certain commodities, as the competition among domestic
manufacturers last year and the large exports of some products resulted in unfavorable
action by some foreign countries with reference to imports of Japanese goods.”50  More
stringent government control, this time including a retaliative component, is accomplished
through 1934 trade legislation.  It provides government with full control over foreign trade
through the right to limit or prohibit exports or imports of certain goods, and set prices for
certain goods.  It strengthens earlier legislation by providing government with the right to
make membership of an export guild or association obligatory, in order to exercise control
over export product quality and avoid excessive competition among Japanese exporters in
foreign markets.  And, for the first time, it includes a retaliative component, providing
government with the right to at any time change import tariffs.51
But trade with most industrialized countries has become constrained so that Japan
redoubles its efforts to develop new, non-industrialized export markets through a ‘new
country policy’: “As for the new countries, not or barely familiar with Japanese products,
Japan will make an effort to by their natural resources to the extent that they will buy its
products, and this with the purpose of turning them into loyal clients.  This policy will be
applied particularly to the whole of Africa, Central and South America, China, India, Siam,
the Straits Settlements and the Near Orient.”52  These countries often being debtor
countries, Japan has to buy from them in order to be able to sell to them.  It will thus buy
from them natural resources, often at lower prices than those from industrialized countries,
and concentrate in its bilaterally balanced trade with industrialized countries on specialized
                                                
48 HOWE, 1996: 174.
49 NAKAMURA, 1994: 45.
50 ICB, 1933 (1): 619.
51 BULLETIN, 1934 (1): 15-16 and BULLETIN, 1934 (2): 17-18.
52 Translated from French.  BULLETIN, 1934 (1): 16.
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machinery and natural resources not available elsewhere.
It is this kind of thinking then which is being applied to Japanese-American trade relations
from 1934 onwards.  Japan’s trade deficit with the United States is growing.  This forces
Japan to start importing items available elsewhere from other countries.  One of those
items is raw cotton.53  Imports from India are linked to exports and thus cannot be
increased indefinitely. But a number of new producers are arising which produce high
quality raw cotton, one of which is Brazil.
It is important to note that importing natural resources from non-industrialized debtor
countries also meets a growing concern among Japanese administrators and thinkers about
geo-strategic control over natural resources.54  It is felt that natural resources are controlled
by only a few countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, and that it is wiser to
diversify sources of natural resources such as raw cotton.
This entails in the first place a drive for increased self-sufficiency through the promotion of
raw cotton cultivation in Japanese colonies and spheres of influence, and furthermore
efforts to import raw cotton from smaller, independent producers.
From the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 efforts are made to grow cotton in Korea,
first through a Raw Cotton Cultivation Association, then through the Japanese colonial
government.  Short-lived private sector efforts, also prompted by World War I’s resource
scarcity are made in China, along the Peking-Hangkow and Shantung railways, in 1917 and
1918 respectively.  Other failures follow in the 1920s, with efforts by (1) the Kwantung
Government in Manchuria (1924), (2) the Peruvian Cotton Co.55, with the support of the
Japan Raw Cotton Trading Co., in Peru (1926)56, and (3) the Companhia Niponica de
Plantaçâo do Brasil57, established by the Kanegafuchi Cotton Mills Co.58, in the Amazon
in Brazil (1928).59  We will expand on the latter initiative further on.
More successful efforts, benefiting from a sense of urgency after the above mentioned
Japanese-Indian trade frictions, are undertaken in the 1930s.  In addition to continued but
                                                
53 There is quantitative evidence of a link between a deteriorating trade
balance and decreasing imports of United States raw cotton:1934, the year
of the decline in Japanese silk exports and United States trade
restrictions, is the first year of a dramatic decline in raw cotton
imports from the United States.  There is also qualitative evidence: one
can find sufficient ontemporary analyses linking reduced Japanese
purchases of United States raw cotton to a worsening Japan-United States
trade balance.  (BULLETIN, 1936 (2): 14, and BULLETIN, 1937: 20)
54
 One example is T. Nawa.  See NAWA, 1936 and NAWA, 1937.
55 In Japanese: Perû Menka Kabushikigaisha.
56 NICHIMEN KABUSHIKIGAISHA SHASHI HENSHÛ IINKAI – SHASHI HENSHÛBU, 1994:
94.
57 In Japanese: Nanbei Takushoku Kabushikigaisha.  In English: South
American Development Co.
58 In Japanese: Kanegafuchi Bôseki Kabushikigaisha.
59 NAWA, 1936: 92-93.
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not very fruitful efforts in Korea, a new and massive attempt is undertaken in Manchuria in
the early 1930s.  In 1934, for instance, the establishment of the Japan-Manchuria Cotton
Cultivation Association60 is announced, which will aim to develop raw cotton cultivation in
Korea and Manchuria.  Its partners are the All Japan Cotton Spinners Association, the
Japan Cotton Traders Association, and the South Manchuria Railway Co., to be assisted
by the Japanese government Department of Resource Development.61  Subsequently a
Manchurian Cotton Association and a Manchurian Cotton Sales Corporations are
established under public-private partnerships.  Efforts are also made in North China by the
Hsing Chung Corporation, a subsidiary of the South Manchuria Railway Corporation.  A
problem is that these projects suffer from physical limitations, indigenous resistance or the
long-term nature of the venture.  Therefore in the short run the most promising strategy is
to import from countries such as Brazil.62
3.  THE MISSION
3.1.  Purpose of the mission
When Japan is thus confronted with a deteriorating Japanese-American trade balance, and
worries about geo-strategic control about natural resources, it considers the possibility of
importing raw cotton from Brazil and mounting a mission in that direction.  The concrete
reasoning behind this mission is best reflected in a statement made by the leader of the
mission, Hirao Hachisaburo, during a farewell lunch organized for members of the
economic mission by the Osaka textile community in March 1935.63  Hirao remarks there
that Japanese-Brazilian relations started more than 40 years earlier, and the first Japanese
migrants arrived in Brazil 25 years earlier.  Yet, Japanese-Brazilian trade is insignificant.
The reason is that Japan has been thinking of Brazil as a country to send migrants to only,
and not as a country to develop trade with.  Nevertheless, Brazil is big, not densely
populated, and rich in natural resources.  And it is quite natural that Brazil, the country
with the potential of becoming the biggest agricultural producer, and Japan, striving to
become the world’s most advanced industrial country should develop trade relations.
Before, the problem was that Brazil only grew coffee, a commodity not consumed in large
quantities by Japan, and Brazil being a debtor country it would only buy products from
                                                
60 In Japanese: Nichiman Menka Saibai Kyôkai.
61 ICB, 1934 (1): 436, and ICB, 1936 (3): 270.
62 NAWA, 1936: 108-115.
63 “Ken-haku keizai shisetsudan sôbetsu goshokkai”  (Farewell luncheon
meeting for economic mission to Brazil).  Dai Nihon Bôseki Rengôkai Geppô
(Monthly of the All Japan Spinners’ Association), 511 (April 1935) 18-22.
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countries buying its coffee.  As a result small countries had more trade with Brazil than
Japan.  However, coffee production and trade have now collapsed and a move towards
other crops is going on.  Because of physical conditions, none is as successful as cotton,
which is precisely a commodity of which Japan needs large quantities.  Furthermore, a
decent profit can now be made out of cotton because of rising raw cotton prices in the
United States and thus worldwide.  Which naturally brings to mind the possibility of
importing raw cotton produced by Japanese migrants in Brazil.
3.1.1.  Cotton production in Brazil at the time of the mission
Hirao’s taking the prospects of cotton production in Brazil serious is correct.  Cotton
production is rapidly expanding at the time of the mission.  While a rapidly growing but
still modest domestically oriented industrial sector, not unlike Japan’s boosted by World
War I, is making inroads on a still dominant non-diversified export-oriented agricultural
sector, cotton cultivation is making inroads on coffee cultivation, the former initially
evolving with and then only partially replacing the latter from the early 1930s onwards.
That is because in the early 1930s world coffee prices collapse and world raw cotton prices
are comparatively high because of United States price support measures.  As a result, Sao
Paulo state raw cotton acreage and production starts growing rapidly.64
3.1.2.  The Japanese migrant community in Brazil at the time of the mission
The idea to import raw cotton from Japanese migrants in Brazil also makes good sense.
Somewhat less than 190,000 Japanese migrants arrive in Brazil during the pre-World War
II period.65  That is somewhat less than the 231,206 Japanese migrants to Hawaii, but much
higher than the 107,253 migrants to the continental United States.  Still, before 1920,
arrivals of Japanese immigrants are highly erratic, not exceeding 40 some years,
approaching 7,000 other years.  A sustained rapidly rising trend only starts in 1924, that is
after the economic crash of 1920 and the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, and arrivals
exceed 20,000 in 1933 and 1934.  Anti-Japanese agitation, however, starts in 1924 already
and results in 1934 in president Vargas’ so-called “2 percent law”, which stipulates that
post-1934 yearly arrivals will be restricted to 2 percent of total arrivals during the 50 year
period up to and inclusive of 1933.  In the case of Japan this means from then onwards app.
3000 persons, as opposed to a peak of 23,299 yearly arrivals in 1933.66
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 For growth of the Sao Paulo state raw cotton acreage and production
see PEARSE, 1937.
65 KOKUSAI KYÔRYOKU JIGYÔDAN, 1994: 126.
66 YOKOGAWA, 1995: 121.
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In 1935, the Japanese immigrant community is facing another challenge, in addition to the
“2 percent law”.  It is in the midst of a process of significant change.  Until the early 1920s,
Japanese farmers arrive mostly as contract laborers destined for the coffee plantations.
From around that time, however, they start arriving as independent colonizers, a group
which also grows through the addition of plantation laborers who have fulfilled their
contracts.  When coffee prices collapse in the early 1930s, these farmers start engaging in
increasing numbers in raw cotton cultivation.67 Within that context is interesting, for
instance, the claim by the Japanese community in the state of Sao Paulo that during the
year 1936 they are responsible for 56 percent of the crop in Sao Paulo and 30 percent of the
total Brazilian raw cotton production.68
3.2.  Content of the mission
The mission, organized under the auspices of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, departs from Yokohama on 8 April 1935 and arrives in Rio de Janeiro on 15
May.  The mission departs from Brazil on 11 June to arrive back in Japan on 5 November,
after visiting the United States and Europe.  The mission is headed by Hirao Hachisaburo69,
whom we mentioned already, and further consists of i.a. Ito Takenosuke70, Seki Keizo71,
Atsumi Ikuro72, Iwai Takahito73 and Okuno Kei74.
That this is a strong mission is first of all demonstrated by the fact that it is supported by
the Japanese government, it being fully in line with stated Japanese government policies.  It
benefits from full cooperation from Japanese consular officers and ambassadors.  Its
                                                
67 There exists ample evidence of the importance of Japanese immigrants
for the Brazilian raw cotton cultivation.  An interesting source is A.
Pearse, member of the International Cotton Federation, who visits Brazil
in the early 1920s and again in 1937.  In his report on his 1937 visit,
he pays substantial attention to the movement of Japanese farmers from
the coffee to new cotton growing areas, often giving rise to vibrant new
Japanese communities.  (PEARSE, 1937: 151, and PEARSE, 1937: 158)
68 ICB, 1936 (4): 21.
69 JMYB, 1939 (2): 966: leader of the mission and president of the
shipbuilding company Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co.
70 JMYB, 1939 (2): 977: Representative of the Japan Cotton Merchants’
Union (cartel) and managing director of the trading company Ito Trading
Co.  (In Japanese: Itôchû Shôji Kabushikigaisha)
71 JMYB, 1939 (2): 1032: Representative of the cartel All Japan Cotton
Spinners’ Association and managing director of the spinning company Toyo
Cotton Mills Co.  (In Japanese: Tôyô Bôseki Kabushikigaisha)
72 JMYB, 1939 (2): 948: Director of the shipping line Osaka Mercantile
Marine Co.  (In Japanese: Osaka Shôsen Kabushikigaisha)
73 JMYB, 1939 (2): 977: Representative of the trading company Mitsui and
Co.  (In Japanese: Mitsui Bussan Kabushikigaisha)
74 JMYB, 1938: 1039: Representative of the trading company Mitsubishi
Trading Co.  (In Japanese: Mitsubishi Shôji Kabushikigaisha)
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members are treated by the Brazilian Government as state visitors.  It raises issue far
beyond the scope of a private mission.  A Brazilian government mission is mounted the
next year in response.  And Hirao is nominated for the House of Peers in November 1935,
that is upon completion of the mission, and occupies the cabinet position of Minister of
Education during the years 1936-37.75
It also includes representatives of the most important Japanese firms at that time.  As a
bridge between public and private sector there are representatives of two government
controlled cartels: the Japan Cotton Spinners Association, which, as mentioned above,
organizes mill owners, and the Japan Cotton Traders Association, which organizes raw
cotton traders.76  And the private sector representatives represent all major cotton trading,
cotton spinning, general trading and shipping companies at that time.
The mission also operates on the basis of a strong mandate.  In order to accomplish its
immediate objective of increasing raw cotton imports, it raises issues extending far beyond
the responsibility of the textiles industry or even the private sector as such.  There is, for
instance, the decision to base future Japanese-Brazilian trade relations on the “balanced
trade” principle, which will naturally involve trade in non-textile products.  In addition to
the import of raw cotton, Japan will consider the import of cotton seed; cotton seed oil;
manioc; and fibers.  Brazil, on the other hand, should consider the purchase of inter alia
Japanese machinery and silk, and allow the creation of permanent fairs of Japanese
products in important Brazilian cities.77  Then there is the Japanese insistence on making
the extension of Japanese-Brazilian trade relations conditional upon addressing issues
relating to Japanese migration to Brazil.  It appears that this is not merely an issue of
national pride, or related to Japan’s interest in maintaining an outlet for its excess
population.  It is also because resolving problems relating to migration is critical to the
achievement of the mission’s immediate objective of increasing raw cotton imports.
The program of the mission is very extensive.  It meets with President Vargas, federal
ministers, state governors, the business community (mainly in Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paulo) and journalists.  It visits cotton gins, spinning mills and the (cotton) commodity
exchange.78  In addition, research on a number of topics is allocated to different people.79
Hirao carries out research on problems related to finance and investment.  Seki studies
problems related to raw cotton transactions.  Ito researches problems related to Japanese
                                                
75 JMYB, 1939 (2): 966.
76 See above for earlier involvement of the All Japan Cotton Traders
Association in the Nichiman Menka Saibai Kyôkai.
77 BULLETIN, 1935: 15.
78 NIHON SHÔKÔ KAIGIJÔ, 1936: 6 and further.
79 NIHON SHÔKÔ KAIGIJÔ, 1936: 4-5.
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exports to Brazil.  Atsumi carries out research on problems related to maritime transport
between Japan and Brazil.  Iwai studies problems related to Japanese imports from Brazil.
And Okuno researches problems related to the growing of raw cotton in Brazil.
3.3.  Reporting by the mission80
3.3.1.  To the Brazilian government
A report on the mission, an extensive technical report, is made to the Brazilian
government.  This report is about the acceleration of the cotton harvest; strict enforcement
of crop drying; standardization of product quality; strengthening of supervision of textile
factories; improvement of technology; uniformity of baling; adoption of universal
standards; internationalization of the raw cotton market; establishment of an agricultural
credit facility; collection of accurate statistics; etc.
It is difficult to at this stage assess the role played by this report in the process of
professionalization of the sector, although one would assume the Sao Paulo state
government to take into account the preferences of a potentially large client.  It should be
noted, however, that this report constitutes just one step in a larger process of
professionalization, which dates back to at least the early 1920s visits by representatives of
the International Cotton Federation, and continues after the departure of the mission.81
The legal stability and regulatory framework resulting from these measures implemented
by the Sao Paulo state government appear to be successful in generating an increase in raw
cotton acreage and production, and overall product quality82, as can be derived from the
attached table and figure.
3.3.2.  To the Japanese business community
A general report on the Brazilian business environment is also made to the Japanese
business community.  The mission report emphasizes in the first place the overall potential
of the Brazilian raw cotton export sector.  It assesses the possibility of locally financing
FDI activities, noting that the Yokohama Specie Bank is present in Brazil through a
subsidiary but that nikkei or Japanese-origin banking amounts to next to nothing.  Finally,
                                                
80 For info on the content and outcome of the mission see SAITO, s.d.:
168, JMYB, 1936 (1): 106-107, BULLETIN, 1935: 15-16, and SUZUKI, 1995:
157-158.
81 For an overview of cotton industry regulations enacted before and
after the 1935 mission see PEARSE, 1937: 23, 160 and 167, ICB, 1934 (2):
24, ICB, 1937 (1): 366, and ICB, 1938: 202.
82 ICB, 1936 (4): 21.
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the promise of Brazil as an export market for Japanese products is highlighted.  In this
regard, attention is called to the fact that, in order to protect domestic commodity
production, Brazil is rapidly erecting a customs duty fence.  Japanese companies targeting
the Brazilian market should thus act rapidly.83
All of this is made a little more concrete during a welcoming lunch organized by the Osaka
textile community in December 1935.  Hirao Hachisaburo, echoing pre-departure
statements, says that it is important to import raw cotton from Brazil to reduce the trade
deficit with the United States, and at the same time assist the migrants.  The mission,
however, seems to have clarified Hirao’s thinking on the migrant issue.  Specifically, he
mentions the need to build up an exclusively Japanese supply chain of raw cotton.84
3.3.3.  Targeting the Japanese migrant community
3.3.3.1.  A mental framework
Increasing and professionalizing the production of raw cotton so as to enable larger imports
thereof thus in fact means helping the Japanese immigrant community while furthering
Japan’ strategic needs.  It is important to understand that there pre-existed a mental
framework allowing for the co-optation of Japanese migrants everywhere to meet strategic
needs of the Japanese nation.  Noting that the “the terms ‘expansion’, ‘colonization,’ and
’emigration’ were often used interchangeably, indicating that in the Japanese view these
were all aspects of Western power and influence in the world”, Akira Iriye provides us with
ample evidence thereof.85  Just one example is Okawahira Takamitsu, whose Japanese
Emigration86 contains a preface stating that emigration is the best way to promote
industrialization and increase capital in Japan.  The emigration of laborers prevents the
lowering of wages and standards of life at home by restoring an equilibrium between the
supply and demand of labor, while overseas Japanese will send and bring home the money
earned.  The money is equivalent to foreign loans at no interest.  Once the Japanese
overseas have established their “social colonies”, they will be able to supply needed raw
materials for the homeland and develop a market for Japanese products.  The result will be
the rise and expansion of Japanese commerce and industry.
                                                
83 For a general discussion of 1930s import substitution
industrialization policies see BURNS, 1980: 423-424.
84 “Hô-haku keizai shisetsu kangei goshokkai” (Welcoming luncheon meeting
for economic mission to Brazil).  Dai Nihon Bôseki Rengôkai Geppô
(Monthly of the All Japan Spinners’ Association), 519 (December 1935) 4-
11.
85 IRIYE, 1972: 36-40 and 129-131.
86 In Japanese: Nihon Imin-ron.
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3.3.3.2.  Concrete measures
These instances of advocacy translate into concrete government support measures for
emigration.  In 1893, an informally government-supported Colonization Society87 is
established in Japan.  In 1894, an Emigrant Protection Regulation88 is enacted, delegating
issues pertaining to migration to the private sector.  In 1896, a broader Emigrant Protection
Law89is enacted.  In 1921, in view of domestic recession, the Japanese government starts
providing subsidies to the Overseas Enterprise Emigration Co.90 for advertisements within
Japan promoting emigration.  In 1923, the Japanese government starts providing subsidies
and commissions to migration companies pertaining to the actual shipping of migrants.
Such assistance, combined with strict embassy and consular registration upon arrival, helps
to maintain a certain measure of allegiance towards the home country, facilitating the
mobilization of migrants for the home country’s strategic needs.
A much more direct mechanism of control over migrants is established through the 1927
Law on Overseas Emigration Associations91.  This law facilitates the purchase of land
overseas, and thus the entry into so-called cultivation enterprises.  Initiatives resulting in
the enactment of this law commence in 1923, when Nagano Prefecture’s Shinanô Overseas
Association92 develops a plan to purchase land in Brazil; develop the area; and dispatch its
inhabitants as independent (as opposed to contract) colonizers.  In 1924, it buys 2,200
alqueires, some 5,300 hectares93, in Aliança, state of Sao Paulo, calls the area Aliança
Overseas Colony94, and starts selling the land in lots.  Somewhat later it buys an additional
6,250 hectares.  Overseas associations in prefectures such as Kumamoto, Tottori and
Toyama follow Nagano’s example, jointly buy land, and develop a second and third
Aliança on adjacent land.  But dividedness and economic deadlock cause the experiment to
fail.95
The 1927 law, however, gives rise to the creation of overseas emigration associations all
over Japan, as well as to the creation of a coordinating Federation of Overseas Emigration
Associations96.  In 1928, this federation buys for development in the state of Sao Paulo
                                                
87 In Japanese: Minshoku Kyokai.  For the program of this society see
IRIYE, 1972: 40-41.
88 In Japanese: Imin Hogo Kisoku.  YOKOGAWA, 1995 (1): 118.
89 In Japanese: Imin Hogo Hô.  YOKOGAWA, 1995 (1): 118.
90 In Japanese: Imingaisha Kaigai Kôgyô Kabushikigaisha.
91 In Japanese: Kaigai Ijû Kumiai Hô.
92 In Japanese: Shinanô Kaigai Kyôkai.
93 HOLLOWAY, 1980: 160: 1 alqueire equals 2.42 hectares.
94 In Japanese: Ariansa Ijû-chi.
95 YOKOGAWA, 1995 (2): 136.
96 In Japanese: Kaigai Ijû Kumiai Rengôkai.
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12,932 alqueires (31,295 hectares) in Bastos; 1,327 alqueires  (3,211 hectares) in Aliança;
47,530 alqueires (115022 hectares) in Tiete and 12,500 alqueires (30,250 hectares) in Tres
Barros.  Interestingly enough, in 1929, having promoted emigration to these new
settlements, the federation formally establishes in Brazil a local representative agency,
Bratac.97  It brings under its jurisdiction not only the three Alianças and other above
mentioned settlements, but rapidly grows into an association controlling other Japanese
settlements in Sao Paulo, Parana and other states in South Brazil.
3.3.3.3.  Early efforts of the cotton industry to capitalize on migrants
There thus appears to be in place not only a mental framework but also concrete
mechanisms of control allowing for the potential of the migrant community to be tapped by
the 1935 mission.  Added to this are earlier efforts of the Japanese cotton industry to use
migrants for its cotton growing needs.98  In 1925, the governor of the Brazilian state of Para
indicates to the Japanese ambassador that his government is prepared to make available to
Japan large tracts of land, provided that Japanese migrants dedicate themselves to opening
up and bringing under cultivation these lands.  The state of Para is at that time aiming to
recover from a deep economic crisis following the so-called rubber boom economic high.99
The Japanese ambassador himself having toured the proposed area, the area is further
inspected in August 1926 by a representative of the Japanese cotton spinning giant
Kanegafuchi Cotton Mills Co., Fukuhara Hachiro.  He concludes that part of it is indeed
suited to Japanese colonization and cotton cultivation.  Subsequently, on 27 March 1928,
Prime Minister Tanaka convenes a meeting of 27 important business people, among them
the then 89 years old well known Meiji entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi, “to discuss with
them the course to follow regarding the topic of emigration, colonization and cotton
cultivation in Brazil.”100  Explaining the Brazilian offer transmitted through the Japanese
ambassador and assessed by Fukuhara, Tanaka remarks: “Estimating that there are grounds
for an enterprise which is profitable for the country, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs would
very much wish this to be realized, and M. Fukuhara has made efforts in that regard since
his return.  In submitting this project to you, the Minister desires that you take it up and
make it a private matter; because the government would wish to abstain and not give any
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98 BULLETIN, 1927: 20, BULLETIN, 1928: 21-22, BULLETIN, 1936 (1): 13,
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guarantee or assistance.”101  This is illustrative of the fact that the Japanese government
often provides leadership without becoming explicitly involved.  During the same year, a
Companhia Niponica de Plantaçao do Brasil102, headed by the same Fukuhara is
established.  Still in 1928 it obtains some 1 million hectares from the Para state
government.  And in 1929, settlement and exploitation starts, largely resulting in failure
because of misfits between crops grown and climatic conditions.
4.  CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISSION
As a result of the mission, there is a significant increase in Japanese-Brazilian trade.
Japanese imports from Brazil, consisting almost entirely of raw cotton, jump from 158,098
pounds in 1935 to 1,683,333 pounds in 1936 and 2,122,106 pounds in 1937. Japanese
exports to Brazil experience a smaller but respectable increase from 246,852 pounds in
1935 to 349,609 pounds in 1936 and 647,472 pounds in 1937.  Both are maintained at
comparable levels during the next few years. 103  This phenomenon can be explained by at
least three factors: a favorable shipping arrangement for transportation between Brazil and
Japan, the adoption and development of an institutional support system, and the
development of foreign direct investment initiatives.
4.1.  Shipping
Trade is made practically feasible by an agreement among the various Japanese shipping
lines to collectively lower the cost of freight between Brazil and Japan - regardless of the
much longer distance - reducing it to the cost of freight between Brazil and the United
States so as to make imports of raw cotton from Brazil competitive with those from the
United States.104
Note the similarity between this arrangement and the important 1893 India raw cotton
agreement.  As Howe explains it: “Nonetheless, in 1893, as a result of several visits to
India by Japanese business leaders and support from the Foreign Ministry and Minister of
Agriculture and Commerce, a major shipping agreement was concluded.  Under this
agreement the Nihon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) offered special shipping rates to Japanese raw
cotton importers.  This move was accompanied by the establishment of a comprehensive
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group of Japanese trading and banking firms in Bombay.”105
4.2.  Foreign direct investment
But being able to ship the cotton is not enough.  A whole structure has to be developed to
increase production, purchase, process, bale, stock etc.  In order to do this a number of
organizations are created.
4.2.1.  Cotton growing, processing and trading
4.2.1.1  The Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co.106 and Brazcot Ltda.107108
This is one of the most sizable initiatives undertaken after the 1935 mission, and the one
which is probably most directly causally related to it.
A Japanese parent company, the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. is established on the 1st of
February 1936 in Osaka with a capital of 2 million yen.  The articles of incorporation of the
new company state the following objectives109: (1) management of cotton gins and baling
factories in Brazil and elsewhere; (2) wholesaling and trade of raw cotton and other
commodities in Brazil and elsewhere; and (3) all business and relevant investment related
or incidental to the above said.  To reach these objectives, a Brazilian subsidiary, Brazcot
Ltda., is established on the 1st of July 1936 in Sao Paulo.
The activities of Brazcot Ltda. are situated at different levels.  It is first of all active in the
field of banking.  As such it is recorded to establish and hold securities of a daughter firm,
Casa Bancaria Brazcot Ltda.110  This bank occupies itself with financial activities related
to freight collection.  It is also active in the field of cotton ginning.  As such it is recorded
to directly operate 5 cotton gins and indirectly, through financial controls, operate some
more.111  Finally, it is active in the field of cotton trading and exports.  The 1940 annual
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report, for instance, mentions that out of 118,163 bags of cotton of 182 kilos each, no less
than 103,423 were exported to Japan.112  Thus one can speak of an integrated company of
some sorts.
The establishment of the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and Brazcot Ltda. is a direct result
of the 1935 mission.  The establishment of the Japanese parent company takes place only
two months after Hirao’s final reporting to the Osaka textile community in December
1935.  It is completely in line with the mission’s recommendations.  And individuals
participating in and companies represented on the mission get involved in the Japan-Brazil
Raw Cotton Co.  Hirao Hachisaburo113, Ito Takenosuke114 and Seki Keizo115 assume
management positions in the new company and personally own company stock.  The fact
that Ito Takenosuke and Seki Keizo are leading persons in important industry associations
does not hurt the new company’s prospects.116  Some of the companies these people
represented on the mission, Itochu and Co.117 and Toyo Cotton Mills Co.118 also get
involved through stock ownership.  Other companies represented on the mission also get
involved through the detachment of personnel and/or stock ownership.119
Earlier, we raised the issue of public-private cooperation.  There are indications that the
Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. can indeed be considered a kind of “national interest
company”.  Sources speak of the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. as a “national policy
company based on joint investment by the private sector.”120  And this seems to be
confirmed by a very broad spread of stock ownership, including competing companies,
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delivers a managing director and a director, and owns stock in the amount
of 2,300 yen.  Other firms represented during the mission and later
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others: the Osaka Commercial Shipping Co., Mitsui and Co., Japan Raw
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120 See KABUSHIKIGAISHA TÔMEN SHASHI SEISAKU IINKAI, 1991: 67.
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which points to government inducement or leadership.  In addition to the above mentioned
stock holders, there are i.a. Toyo Colonization Co.121, Tozan Agricultural Co.122, and the
cotton spinning firms Dai Nihon Cotton Mills Co.123, Kanegafuchi Cotton Mills Co.124,
Fukushima Cotton Mills Co.125 and Kureha Cotton Mills Co.126.127
Another question raised is the issue of interaction between Japanese trade and investment
on the one hand and Japanese migrant communities on the other hand.  In line with Hirao’s
recommendations, the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. buys, processes and exports raw
cotton produced by Japanese migrants in Brazil.  The 1940 annual report, for instance,
mentions that 1,200,000 yen was paid to acquire raw cotton, and that the greater part of that
money was paid to Japanese cotton growers.128
4.2.1.2.  The Japan-South Manufacturing Co.129 and Bratac130131
Another “national interest company”, government sponsored and closely linked to the
Japanese migrant community, is the Japan-South Manufacturing Co. and its Brazilian
subsidiary, Bratac.
The Japanese parent company, the Japan-South Manufacturing Co., is established on the
10th of July 1937 in Tokyo with a capital of 1 million yen.  The articles of incorporation of
the new company state the following objectives132: (1) acquisition, management and
disposal of land; (2) provision of capital for colonization purposes and savings facilities for
Japanese migrants abroad; (3) purchase, processing and trading of produce from those
migrants; (4) provision of necessary goods to those migrants; (5) undertakings incidental to
the aforementioned; and (5) initiatives necessary for the overseas development of Japanese
migrants abroad.
The Japan-South Manufacturing Co. is a follow-up to the aforementioned Federation of
Overseas Emigration Associations.  After the 1927 Law on Overseas Emigration
Associations, this organization occupies itself with purchasing land and administering
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Japanese emigrant communities in Brazil through its subsidiary Bratac.  In 1937, it is felt
that providing support to Japanese emigrants through the mere buying of land is no longer
sufficient and that they have to be provided with broader economic opportunities.  The
Japan-South Manufacturing Co. is established to take initiatives in that direction.
The Japan-South Manufacturing Co. takes over all assets from the Federation of Overseas
Emigration Associations, including Bratac.  In 1937, Bratac operates operate 4 cotton gins;
8 rice refineries; 5 coffee selection factories; 2 oil factories; 3 sugar factories; 2 pork meat
processing factories; 5 flour mills; 3 tobacco factories; 2 ice plants; 3 sawing mills; 3 brick
factories; 1 tile factory; 1 mint factory; 2 silkworm breeding factories; 1 tea factory; 1
agricultural equipment repair shop; 1 power station; 11 store houses; 2 waterworks;  and 7
telephone networks.133  Under the umbrella of the Japan-South Manufacturing Co., its
activities are substantially broadened.  In July 1937, Bratac creates a bank, Casa Bancaria
Bratac de Carlos Y. Kate.134  Objective of the new bank is to build on spare money
resulting from economic prosperity migrants in Bastos, Tiete, Aliança and Tres Barros.  On
the 3th of September 1938, Bratac creates a mining section, Companhia de Mineraçâo
Brasileira Ltda.  On the 13th of September 1938, Bratac establishes a trading section,
Casa Bratac Ltda.  On the 19th of December 1938, Bratac creates a raw cotton section,
Algodoeira Bratac.  In April 1941, a silk factory is established.
Bratac is of course involved in much more than the field of raw cotton alone.  The
provision of land and general agricultural financing naturally benefits the cultivation of raw
cotton too, and that, like Brazcot Ltd., Bratac is involved in cotton ginning is demonstrated
by the aforementioned 1937 state of affairs.
The establishment of the Japan-South Manufacturing Co. is a direct outcome of the 1935
mission.  Some of the phenomena observed during the analysis of the Japan-Brazil Raw
Cotton Co. can again be observed.  Hirao Hachisaburo, Ito Takenosuke and Seki Keizo
again take up executive positions and personally own company stock.135  And Itochu
Trading Co., Toyo Cotton Mills Co. and other companies represented on the mission get
                                                
133 See NICHINAN SANGYÔ KABUSHIKIGAISHA, 1938: 5-6.  Somewhat different
figures, probably for a different time period – it is not clear which –
are given in NIHON IMIN 80NENSHI HENSAN IINKAI, 1991: 357-358.
134 In Japanese: Burataku Ginkô.  See HANDA, 1976: 79, and PAURISUTA
SHINBUNSHA, 1958: 3.  In October 1940, Casa Bancaria Bratac de Carlos Y.
Kate changes into Banco America do Sul Ltda. (In Japanese: Yûgen Sekinin
Gôshi Kaisha Nanbei Ginkô).  (HANDA, 1976: 88, and PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA,
1958: 3)  In July 1947, Banco America do Sul Ltda. changes into Banco
America do Sul S/A (In Japanese: Kabushikigaisha Nanbei Ginkô).
(PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA, 1958: 3)
135 Hirao: Chairman of the Board of Directors; stock in the amount of
2,000 yen.  Ito: managing director; stock in the amount of 200 yen.
Keizo: managing director; stock in the amount of the 200 yen.  (various
annual reports)
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involved.136
It is interesting to see that there exist links between the Japan-South Manufacturing Co.
and the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co.  They share management personnel and individual
and corporate stockholders.  And the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. owns stock of the
Japan-South Manufacturing Co. in the amount of 1,000 yen.137
Perhaps more clearly than the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. is the Japan-South
Manufacturing Co. a “national interest company”.  Its articles of incorporation put clear
limits on the involvement of foreigners in the company.138  Most of the shares are owned
by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.139  And, as in the case of the Japan-Brazil Raw
Cotton Co., we see a broad coalition of private capital, which points to government
sponsorship.
The company’s close interaction with the Japanese migrant community in Brazil should be
clear from the aforementioned articles of incorporation and the 1937 state of activities.
4.2.1.3.  The Tozan Agricultural Co. and The Tozan Conglomerate140
A small conglomerate which is existing from before the mission takes place but takes on a
more important role afterwards is the Tozan group of companies, with activities pertaining
to cotton in the field of immigrant agricultural financing and agricultural research.
The Japanese parent company, Tozan Agricultural Co., is established in 1919 by Iwasaki
Yataro, at that time controlling the important Mitsubishi conglomerate or zaibatsu.
Purpose of the new company is overseas investment in farming and stock raising initiatives
by Japanese migrants.
In 1927, Tozan Agricultural Co. establishes in Brazil a local representative, Casa Tozan,
with a capital of 3,500 contos.141  Still that same year, Casa Tozan establishes a model or
experimental farm in Campinas (Sao Paulo state) under the name Fazenda Monte Deste.  In
1928, a coffee trading business is established in Santos (Sao Paulo state) with capital of
200 contos.  In 1933, a bank is established under the name Casa Bancaria Tozan Ltda.142
                                                
136 Itochu Trading Co.: stock in the amount of 800 yen.  Toyo Cotton
Mills Co.: stock in the amount of 1,000 yen.  Toyo Raw Cotton Co.: stock
in the amount of 1,000 yen.  Osaka Commercial Shipping Co.: stock in the
amount of 4,800 yen.  Japan Raw Cotton Co.: stock in the amount of 1,000
yen.  (various annual reports)
137 Various annual reports.
138 NICHINAN SANGYÔ KABUSHIKIGAISHA, TEIKAN: s.p.: Article 10.
139 Various annual reports.
140 This section is based on NIHON IMIN 80NENSHI HENSAN IINKAI, 1991:
357, and PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA, 1958: 17.
141 The literature contradicts itself here.  Some of the literature does
not mention a local holding company.  Rather it refers to the 1928 Santos
coffee trading business as Casa Tozan.
142 The literature contradicts itself here.  Some of the literature
26
In 1934, a liquor factory is established.  And in 1937, a silk weaving factory is bought and
reestablished.
Important in the field of cotton is first of all Fazenda Monte Deste.  Its activities pertaining
to the upgrading of seeds are recognized by the Sao Paulo State Government and the farm
becomes an official provider of raw cotton seeds to the Sao Paulo State Government.  Then
there are the general agricultural financing activities of Casa Bancaria Tozan Ltda., which
like those of Casa Bancaria Bratac de Carlos Y Kate, can be assumed to benefit raw cotton
cultivation.
The activities of the Tozan group cannot be said to be a result of the 1935 mission as most
of them precede that mission.  But it is clear that its activities support initiatives taken as a
result of the mission, in casu the purchasing of raw cotton from Japanese migrant
communities.  As Japanese migrants move from coffee to cotton cultivation, Tozan’s
model farm, through the provision of seeds and demonstration of efficient farming
techniques, plays an increasingly important role.  The same can be said of its banking
activities.  In this regard, it is also interesting to mention that the Japanese parent company,
Tozan Farming Co., gets involved in the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. through stock
ownership in the amount of 2,300 yen.
Tozan’s activities do not seem to benefit from government sponsorship.
Tozan’s link with the migrant community through banking, the provision of seeds and
teaching has been explained above.
4.2.1.4.  The Toyo Raw Cotton Co. and Algodoeira Do Sul Ltda.143144
Above we have already discussed the involvement of the Toyo Raw Cotton Co. in the 1935
mission, the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan-South Manufacturing Co.
Interesting is, however, that the Toyo Raw Cotton Co. also undertakes other, independent
initiatives in Brazil.
In 1937, the North American subsidiary office of Toyo Raw Cotton Co. in Dallas (Texas),
Southern Cotton145, sends employees to Brazil to investigate the possibility of establishing
a subsidiary office to purchase and export Brazilian cotton.  As a result, a cotton trading
company, Mori and Co.146, is established.  It quickly becomes one of the top three foreign
cotton trading companies in Brazil.  In 1938, Mori and Co. changes into Algodoeira do Sul
                                                                                                                                                   
mentions 1932.  (NIHON IMIN 80NENSHI HENSAN IINKAI, 1991: 357)
143 In Japanese: Nanbei Menka Yûgen Kaisha.
144 This section is based on HANDA, 1976: 83, PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA, 1958:
49, and KABUSHIKIGAISHA TÔMEN SHASHI SEISAKU IINKAI, 1991: 67-68.
145 In Japanese: Nanbu Menka Kaisha.
146 In Japanese: Mori Shôkai.
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Ltda.147  In July 1940, the company becomes independent from the U.S. operations, comes
under direct control of the Japanese parent company, and changes its name once more.
This independent initiative is probably not a direct result of the 1935 mission, but a result
of the success of other initiatives, such as the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan-
South Manufacturing Co., and the perception that there was room for other Japanese
companies coming in.
This initiative does not seem to benefit from government support.
The Toyo Raw Cotton Co. does, however, cultivate ties with the Japanese migrant
community.  Its activities in Brazil can be divided into two.  On the one hand, it occupies
itself with what could be called second level trading.  It buys cotton from cotton traders,
reinspects it, reclassifies it according to its own categories and exports it.   On the other
hand, it occupies itself with purchasing raw cotton directly from Japanese migrants.
Sources mention a whole series of targeted communities, which include such Bratac
managed colonies such as Tiete and Aliança.
4.2.1.5.  The Japan Raw Cotton Co.148 and Marumaru And Co.149
Above we have already discussed the involvement of the Japan Raw Cotton Co. in the
1935 mission, the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan-South Manufacturing Co.
Interesting is, however, that – like the Toyo Raw Cotton Co. - the Japan Raw Cotton Co.
also undertakes other, independent initiatives in Brazil.
Thus, in May 1941, a subsidiary trading company is established in Sao Paulo.  The
company buys in Brazil raw cotton, hemp bags,  and industrial use diamonds, and sells in
Brazil band iron, staple fiber cotton, cotton thread and dye stuffs.
This independent initiative is probably not a direct result of the 1935 mission, but a result
of the success of other initiatives, such as the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan-
South Manufacturing Co., and the perception that there was room for other Japanese
companies coming in.
This initiative does not seem to benefit from government support.  Information on ties with
Japanese migrant communities is not available.
4.2.2.  Cotton spinning
4.2.2.1.  The Toyo Cotton Mills Co.150
                                                
147 In July 1940, it changes into Nanbei Menka Kaisha.
148 In Japanese: Nihon Menka Kabushi Kaisha.
149 This section is based on NICHIMEN KABUSHIKIGAISHA SHASHI HENSHÛ
IINKAI - SHASHI HENSHÛBU, 1994: 94 and 562.
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Above we have already discussed the involvement of the Toyo Cotton Mills Co. in the
1935 mission, the Japan-Brazil Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan-South Manufacturing Co.
Interesting is, however, that – like the Toyo Raw Cotton Co. and the Japan Raw Cotton Co.
– the Toyo Cotton Mills Co. also undertakes other, independent initiatives in Brazil.
In 1937, for instance, the Toyo Cotton Mills Co. intends to buy a spinning-weaving mill
with 2,000 spindles and 500 weaving machines in a suburb of Sao Paulo for 4 million yen.
Presumably, the purpose is to make use of Sao Paulo’s ample raw cotton supply.  Whether
the planned production is intended for the Brazilian domestic market or exports elsewhere
is not clear.  Fact is that, because of foreign exchange restrictions imposed by the Japanese
government after 1937, this plan does not materialize.
What makes this intention special is that it demonstrates that even during the pre-war
period Japanese textile firms were interested in manufacturing textiles in Brazil.
It is not clear whether this initiative would have benefited from government support.
Neither is it clear whether and what kind of links would have been established with the
Japanese migrant community.
4.2.3.  General trading
The above initiatives are meant to fuel Japanese imports of Brazilian raw cotton.  To
promote trade in the other direction, a number of Japanese general trading companies begin
operating in Brazil.  Earlier, it was mentioned that Itochu Trading Co. sends an employee
to Brazcot Ltda. to cultivate the market for non-textile goods.  It establishes another agency
yet, for handling of textile goods.151  On the other hand there is Mitsui and Co. which in
November 1938 establishes in Rio de Janeiro a branch office, Nipo-Brasileira Ltda.152
4.3.  Institutional support
Both way trade, in addition to shipping and foreign direct investment, is also maintained
and promoted by the establishment of two important organizations.  The Japan-Brazil
Chamber of Commerce153 is established on the 11th of January 1938.  On the 27th of
January 1938, the opening ceremony is  held in Rio de Janeiro.154  The Japan Chamber of
                                                                                                                                                   
150 This section is based on TÔYÔ BÔSEKI KABUSHIKIGAISHA SHASHI
HENSHÛSHITSU, 1986: 547, and PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA, 1958: 27.
151 ITÔCHÛ SHÔJI KABUSHIKIGAISHA SHASHI HENSHÛSHITSU, 1969: 429.
152 HANDA, 1976: 83.
153 In Japanese: Nippaku Shôgyô Kaigijo.
154 HANDA, 1976: 82.
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Commerce155 is created on the 16th of August 1940, in Sao Paulo.156
An organization which starts to take on a much more important role after the mission is the
Yokohama Specie Bank, operating an office in Rio de Janeiro since July 1919.  Thus far
mainly involved in facilitating remittances by Japanese migrants, the operation of a
Japanese government loan fund allowing Japanese migrants to buy their own land and
allowing Japanese colonization companies to buy land in Brazil, it starts to support the
development of Japanese-Brazilian trade and investment relations also through  research
activities such as into the post 1935 mission Brazilian export surplus with Japan157.
5.  CONCLUSION
At the end of this paper, I would wish to return to some of the issues raised at the
beginning of this paper.  It has been convincingly argued that the 1935 mission can be
considered a Japanese government mission, that it is completely in line with stated
Japanese Government objectives and therefore government supported, while also meeting
textile traders and manufacturers’ quest for every cheaper resources.
It has also been demonstrated that a mental framework and real life precedents for the co-
optation of Japanese migrants for the benefit of the mother country exist and that the
mission and subsequent trade and investment initiatives also target Japanese migrant
communities in Brazil.
Finally, it has been shown that there exists substantial inter-firm cooperation in the format
of cross-firm stock ownership which helps raise necessary capital, spread risk and bring
together managing expertise.
                                                
155 In Japanese: Nihon Shôgyô Kaigijo.
156 HANDA, 1976: 88.
157 PAURISUTA SHINBUNSHA, 1958: 169.
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Table 1: raw cotton imports from the United States and India, 1922-1937
(current prices) (000 yen)
Year 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
U.S. 178,809 177,551 204,918 360,167 317,428 343,563 245,926 276,358
India 209,897 263,027 310,944 475,633 327,521 202,282 232,267 231,108
Year 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
U.S. 176,800 153,700 320,751 381,655 400,918 371,952 372,414 306,388
India 147,688 113,262 91,746 168,796 252,434 259,036 315,060 363,635
Source: FEAJ (various years)
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Table 2: Japan-United States trade, 1922-1937 (current prices) (000 yen)
Year total total raw
cotton
% of total % of total trade
exp. imp. imp. raw cotton imp. balance
to u.s. from u.s. from u.s. imp. from u.s.
1922 732,377 596,169 178,809 41.9% 30.0% 136,207
1923 605,619 511,977 177,551 34.7% 34.7% 93,642
1924 744,926 670,993 204,918 33.9% 30.5% 73,932
1925 1,006,253 664,992 360,167 39.0% 54.2% 341,260
1926 860,881 680,186 317,428 43.8% 46.7% 180,695
1927 833,804 673,686 343,563 55.1% 51.0% 160,118
1928 826,141 625,536 245,926 44.7% 39.3% 200,605
1929 914,084 654,060 276,358 48.3% 42.3% 260,024
1930 506,220 442,883 176,800 48.9% 39.9% 63,338
1931 425,330 342,290 153,700 51.9% 44.9% 83,040
1932 445,147 509,874 320,751 71.7% 62.9% -64,726
1933 492,238 620,779 381,655 63.1% 61.5% -128,541
1934 398,928 769,359 400,918 54.8% 52.1% -370,431
1935 535,389 809,645 371,952 52.1% 45.9% -274,255
1936 594,252 847,490 372,414 43.8% 43.9% -253,238
1937 639,428 1,269,542 306,388 36.0% 24.1% -630,114
Source: FEAJ (various years)
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